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Abstract
International law generally, and the law of the sea in particular, exert a tremendous influence on Australian
interests, not merely in the oceans around the continent, but within the Australian economy generally.
Australia asserts its jurisdiction over the largest maritime area in the world, with an exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) and continental shelf over 1.5 times the size of mainland Australia, and a search and rescue
responsibility covering 10 per cent of the globe. Over 95 per cent by volume of Australian international
trade reaches Australia by sea. Over 99 per cent of the data traffic passing along communications links
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world standards, generates over $50 billion per annum into the national economy. More fundamentally,
over 85 per cent of the Australian population lives within an hour of the coastline, all of which provides a
strong domestic security imperative for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and other Government
agencies to keep Australia’s maritime areas adequately under surveillance and protected. The law of the
sea has a direct impact on ensuring these interests can be protected and the means and mechanisms
available to Australia to do so. This paper examines relevant trends in the law of the sea that impact upon
Australian interests, and assesses regional law of the sea practice.
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International law generally, and the law of the sea in particular, exert a tremendous
inﬂuence on Australian interests, not merely in the oceans around the continent,
but within the Australian economy generally. Australia asserts its jurisdiction over
the largest maritime area in the world, with an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
continental shelf over 1.5 times the size of mainland Australia,1 and a search and
rescue responsibility covering 10 per cent of the globe.2 Over 95 per cent by volume
of Australian international trade reaches Australia by sea.3 Over 99 per cent of the
data trafﬁc passing along communications links reaches Australia through ﬁbre optic
submarine cables.4 The Australian ﬁshing industry, although small by world standards,
generates over $50 billion per annum into the national economy.5 More fundamentally,
over 85 per cent of the Australian population lives within an hour of the coastline, all of
which provides a strong domestic security imperative for the Australian Defence Force
(ADF) and other Government agencies to keep Australia’s maritime areas adequately
under surveillance and protected. The law of the sea has a direct impact on ensuring
these interests can be protected and the means and mechanisms available to Australia
to do so. This paper examines relevant trends in the law of the sea that impact upon
Australian interests, and assesses regional law of the sea practice.
In part, this paper has been prepared as an analysis of, and response to, the paper
entitled A Stronger and More Prosperous World through Secure and Accessible Seas
prepared at the United States Naval War College (NWC) under the direction of the
then Stockton Professor of International Law, Craig Allen. That paper was the result
of a workshop on the future legal global order and was attended by 42 legal experts,
from the United States and 10 other States working in government and academia, in
November 2006. The workshop participants, on a non-attributable basis, attempted
to predict the shape and content of international law as it would affect global legal
order between 2006 and 2020. This paper will examine the conclusions reached by
the experts in the NWC paper and comment on their conclusions. As an effort at
prognostication, it is impossible to evaluate the validity of the conclusions reached,
as it relates to events that have yet to occur, and may not occur for over a decade into
the future. It will however, attempt to test the probability of the experts’ predictions,
in the light of current developments and past State practice.



'3&&%0.0'/"7*("5*0/*/5)&*/%01"$*'*$3&(*0/

'SFFEPNPG/BWJHBUJPO
Given Australia’s strong reliance on its seaborne trade, the ability of vessels to navigate
without substantial restriction around the world is a critical issue. Even though the
bulk of this trade is carried in vessels registered in other States, it is vital to Australian
interests that the guarantees in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
(LOSC) providing for freedom of navigation are retained, upheld and respected by all
States.6 The unlawful restriction of the sea lines of communication between Australia
and the rest of the world could devastate the Australian national economy, and it is
in Australia’s interest to support the existing international legal regime, which has
proven so effective in keeping international sea lanes open and ﬂowing.
The key feature of the NWC paper is the survey of experts with respect to the likelihood
of change to the regime for freedom of navigation in the LOSC in the foreseeable future.
The experts indicated, in varying percentages, their thoughts on whether provisions
in respect of maritime claims and freedom of navigation were being undermined.
While one response to these suggestions would be the author’s own predictions, one
more certain response is to analyse State behaviour in the past 25 years to determine
whether erosion of the LOSC is actually taking place, and in what areas that erosion
is most pronounced. In this way, objective State behaviour can be compared with the
predictions to test their validity, as it is unlikely that the rejection of the LOSC by a large
number of States would happen instantaneously or spontaneously. Rather it would be
marked by a gradual build-up of contrary practice that can be charted and analysed.
The NWC paper noted that there was a substantial likelihood of instability in the
regimes for innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes (ASL)
passage. They stated:
Navigation freedoms cannot be taken for granted in the coming years.
The experts were asked if they believed the following navigation regimes
would remain stable between now and 2020:
38% believed that the innocent passage regime would not remain
stable;
41% said the same thing about transit passage through international
straits; and
51% did not believe archipelagic sea lanes passage would remain
stable.
95% of the experts believed that more States will claim the right to
exercise jurisdiction and control over military activities in their EEZ
by 2020.7
It is submitted that instability and failure of LOSC regimes for freedom of navigation
would not occur instantaneously, but rather would emerge over time through contrary
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State practice. In order to test the likelihood of failure, State practice with respect to
maritime zones and freedom of navigation will be examined statistically, to determine
whether such contrary behaviour, as might be expected prior to regime failure is
evident.
The ﬁrst relevant example of State practice for freedom of navigation is in respect of
the territorial sea. Prior to the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) conducted over the period 1973-82, the width of the territorial sea was
an issue of great contention. Disagreement over the issue of the width of the territorial
sea was principally responsible for the failure of the League of Nations Conference for
the Codiﬁcation of International Law 19308 and of UNCLOS II (1960),9 where it was the
principal issue for the Conference to resolve. By UNCLOS III, the width of the territorial
sea was less of an issue, with the emergence of the EEZ as an accepted concept, and
consequently there was little contention in the adoption of 12 nautical miles as the
maximum breadth of the territorial sea in article 3 of the LOSC.10
It is apparent from the selection of State practice that the LOSC reﬂects a consensus
on the distance of 12 nautical miles, as shown in Table 1.
Distance

No. of States – 1982

No. of States – 2007

3nm

20

6

12nm

94

136

13-199nm

8

1

200nm

15

6

Other

2

1

Table 1: State practice – width of the territorial sea11
Table 1 shows that 12 nautical miles was the favoured distance for the width of the
territorial sea by 1982, with 68 per cent of States using that distance, and a further
14 per cent using distances of less than 12 nautical miles, which is consistent with
article 3. This means that only 18 per cent of littoral States were using distances for
their territorial sea that were inconsistent with the LOSC. By 2007, 89 per cent of
littoral States were using 12 nautical miles, and a further four per cent using lesser
distances. This is a signiﬁcant improvement and demonstrates some normative effect
around article 3.
This conclusion is also supported by the practice of some of those States whose
territorial sea claims are inconsistent with the LOSC. For example, Benin, Congo,
Somalia, Liberia, and Togo assert a territorial sea of 200 nautical miles, but do so
from legislation that predates the LOSC.12 This suggests these States have been lax in
updating their legislative regimes rather than deliberately ﬂouting the LOSC.
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Similar results can be seen in a selection of Asia-Paciﬁc States using the same criteria,
as shown in Table 2.
Distance

No. of States – 1982

No. of States – 2007

3nm

6

1

12nm

38

46

200nm

5

2

Other

1

1

Table 2: State practice – width of the territorial sea (Asian and Paciﬁc States)
If anything, the dominance of 12 nautical miles in a contemporary context is more
pronounced in the Asia-Paciﬁc region. Ninety-four per cent of regional States were in
compliance with the LOSC in 2007, up from 88 per cent in 1982.
While the width of the territorial sea achieving a strong consensus mitigates against the
fracturing of the navigational regimes referred to in the NWC paper, it is by no means
the only relevant factor. State practice in relation to restrictions upon navigation also
needs to be considered. Freedom of navigation has its origins in Hugo Grotius’ response
to the Spanish and Portuguese claims of control over the oceans and territories outside
of Europe by virtue of the Papal Bull and Treaty of Tordesillas.13 These documents
purported not only to give control over territory outside of Europe, but also provided
for exclusive seaborne trading rights in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.14 In
reaction to this assertion, Grotius produced his seminal work, Mare Liberum, asserting
that the oceans were incapable of appropriation by States, and that the ships of any
State could journey anywhere on the world’s oceans.15
In the modern law of the sea, freedom of navigation was perceived as equally important,
and this status was reﬂected in the now superseded Geneva Conventions on the Law
of the Sea. Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1958
guaranteed a right of innocent passage to vessels, non-suspendable for waters in
international straits, and article 23 indicated explicitly that such rights were available
to warships.16 Freedom of navigation on the high seas was guaranteed in article 2 of the
Convention on the High Seas 1958,17 with article 3 of the Convention of the Continental
Shelf Convention 1958 ensuring that the status of waters above a State’s continental
shelf remained as high seas, and therefore enjoying freedom of navigation.18 These
efforts had been prefaced by the International Court of Justice in 1949, in the Corfu
Channel Case, which conﬁrmed the right of innocent passage, available even to
warships, passing through ‘straits used for international navigation’.19 The Court was
also prepared to state that foreign vessels, including warships, during peacetime had
a right of innocent passage through all international straits.
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The current LOSC maintains the approaches found in the Corfu Channel Case and
the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. It deals with navigation in two
distinct contexts. Firstly, it examines freedom of navigation in the territorial sea and
archipelagic waters. Three passage regimes are established in these waters: innocent
passage, transit passage and ASL passage. It then considers freedom of navigation in
areas beyond national sovereignty in article 87.
The regime of innocent passage deals with navigation by ships only in the territorial sea
of a coastal State, and as noted above, it retains the same approach as that used in the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1958 and the Corfu Channel Case.
LOSC article 17 grants ships the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea,
while the remaining articles in section 3(A) indicate how that right is circumscribed.
Essentially vessels are required to transit in a continuous and expeditious fashion,
on the surface of the ocean. Such passage cannot be impeded, except on a nondiscriminatory and temporary basis for essential security purposes.20
LOSC article 19 indicates the activities of a vessel that are considered inconsistent
with a right of innocent passage:
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in
conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international
law.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea
it engages in any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any
other manner in violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the
defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or
security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military
device;
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(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person
contrary to the customs, ﬁscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this
Convention;
(i) any ﬁshing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication
or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
This list does not render passage undertaken by warships, or even squadrons of
warships, contrary to innocent passage, nor does it permit a coastal State from excluding
warships from its waters for failure to notify the coastal State or seek its authorisation.
This is supported by the view taken by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu
Channel Case of the passage of the four British warships along the Channel that led to
the damage to HM Ships Saumarez and Volage.21
The coastal State has the ability to regulate certain matters with respect to a vessel
exercising a right of innocent passage, as listed in LOSC article 21(1):
The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with
the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law,
relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of
all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime
trafﬁc;
(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other
facilities or installations;
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;
(e) the prevention of infringement of the ﬁsheries laws and
regulations of the coastal State;
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof;
(g) marine scientiﬁc research and hydrographic surveys;
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal
State.
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Laws on these subjects cannot be applied to a foreign warship or other sovereign
immune vessel, but can provide a basis for a claim by the coastal State against the ﬂag
State of the offending warship. A warship or other vessel can only be ordered to depart
the territorial sea in the event that it breaches the laws of the coastal State.22
For transit passage through international straits, and ASL passage through archipelagic
waters, the regime is even more generous to transiting vessels. There can be no
suspension of transit or ASL passage in any circumstances, and the range of laws
available to a coastal State applicable to such vessels is also reduced as is evident in
LOSC article 42 and by extension through article 54 to ASL passage:
1. Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits may
adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage through straits,
in respect of all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime trafﬁc,
as provided in article 41;
(b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving
effect to applicable international regulations regarding the
discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the
strait;
(c) with respect to ﬁshing vessels, the prevention of ﬁshing,
including the stowage of ﬁshing gear;
(d) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person
in contravention of the customs, ﬁscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations of States bordering straits.
2. Such laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or in fact
among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of
denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage as deﬁned
in this section.
3. States bordering straits shall give due publicity to all such laws and
regulations.
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of transit passage shall comply
with such laws and regulations.
5. The ﬂag State of a ship or the State of registry of an aircraft entitled
to sovereign immunity which acts in a manner contrary to such laws
and regulations or other provisions of this Part shall bear international
responsibility for any loss or damage which results to States bordering
straits.23
While the LOSC makes it clear there is freedom of navigation on the high seas, the
same freedom is extended to the EEZ by article 58(1).24
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The right of freedom of navigation on the high seas and the EEZ is limited so a vessel
must have ‘due regard’ for the rights of others.25 As such, there is no explicit limitation
based upon security to the beneﬁt of the coastal State beyond that associated with the
rights of others. So for example, the only restriction on the undertaking of military
exercises on the high seas and EEZ of another State would be subject to the noninterference with the rights of other users.26 The issue of military activities in the EEZ
will be explored below.
Within the territorial sea, and in some circumstances beyond it, a number of States
assert what may best be described as a ‘security jurisdiction’. That is to say, they
purport to regulate, restrict or exclude third State vessels from their adjacent waters,
even though the only support for such a jurisdiction in the LOSC is implicit and derives
from the Convention’s deﬁnition of innocent passage not being prejudicial to the peace
and security of the coastal State.
A coastal State has a right to regulate certain matters with respect to a vessel exercising
a right of innocent passage, although these do not refer to security interests.27 The
rights of the coastal State are essentially directed at ensuring the territorial sea has
safe navigation, criminal activity affecting the coastal State, including immigration and
customs, is prohibited, and unauthorised ﬁshing and pollution do not occur.
Nor does the regime of the contiguous zone give rise to a right to restrict or regulate
passage. There is no justiﬁcation within the text of the LOSC that permits a jurisdiction
based around security concerns to be included within the regime of the contiguous
zone, especially as it is part of the EEZ which explicitly has guarantees of freedom of
navigation. The contiguous zone is dealt with in a single article, and does not refer to
security directly, or even by implication.28
A large number of coastal States assert security zones in their territorial sea and
beyond, into the EEZ. The range of measures varies considerably, and does not easily
lend itself to the type of statistical representation undertaken above. Overall, in
excess of 60 coastal States have asserted some form of restriction or notiﬁcation. It
is therefore necessary to summarise the nature of various coastal State measures in
tabular form in Table 3.
State

Type of Rights Asserted

Albania

Warships require prior special authorisation

Algeria

Authorisation must be obtained for warships 15 days prior to their
passage; exception: force majeure

Antigua and
Barbuda

Warships require prior authorisation

Bangladesh

Warships require prior authorisation; contiguous zone of 18nm
with security interests
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State

Type of Rights Asserted

Barbados

Warships require prior authorisation

Brazil

Prohibition of the boarding, searching and capturing of vessels in
the EEZ; military exercises and manoeuvres may be conducted
in the EEZ only with the consent of Brazil

Bulgaria

24nm (‘control rights’)

Cambodia

Control of all foreign activities on the continental shelf,
irrespective of their purpose; contiguous zone of 24nm with
security interests

Cape Verde

Warships require prior authorisation; prohibition of ‘noninnocent use’ of the exclusive economic zone, including weapons
exercises

China

Requires prior notice for transports of waste in territorial sea
and EEZ; warships require prior authorisation; contiguous zone
of 24nm with security interests

Congo

All ships require prior authorisation

Costa Rica

Fishing vessels must announce their passage through the EEZ
beforehand

Croatia

Warships must announce their passage; the number of warships
is limited

Denmark

Warships and governmental ships are required to notify the
Danish authorities prior to their passage through territorial waters
if that involves passage through the Great Belt, the Samsø Belt
or the Øre Sound; prior authorisation is required for more than
three warships passing through at the same time

Djibouti

Prior notice required of any passage of nuclear-powered ships and
ships carrying nuclear or other radioactive material

Ecuador

‘Special area to be avoided’

Egypt

Warships have to announce their passage in advance; ships
carrying nuclear material or other hazardous substances require
prior authorisation; contiguous zone of 24nm with security
interests

El Salvador

Expressed concern at UNCLOS III in respect of military activities
in the EEZ

Estonia

Warships and research vessels must announce their passage
48 hours in advance; authorisation must be applied for nuclearpowered ships 30 days; prior to their passage
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State

Type of Rights Asserted

Finland

Warships and governmental ships have to announce their passage
in advance

Gambia

Asserts the right to prohibit navigation in certain areas of its
continental shelf

Greece

Claims only a 6nm territorial sea but 10nm of airspace for air
trafﬁc control purposes

Grenada

Warships require prior authorisation

Guinea

Taking photographs and transporting toxic or hazardous material
are considered a criminal offence

Guyana

Warships have to announce their passage in advance

Haiti

Passage prohibited to ships carrying waste or materials with
an inherent health or environmental hazard; prohibition of
the passage of all vessels carrying waste or materials that are
environmentally harmful or detrimental to health; furthermore
claims the right to exercise the control required in the EEZ in order
to ensure navigational safety and prevent violations of ﬁnancial,
customs, health and environmental protection regulations;
contiguous zone of 24nm with security interests

India

Warships have to announce their passage in advance; prior
consent to military exercises and manoeuvres in the EEZ and
on the continental shelf; contiguous zone of 24nm with security
interests

Indonesia

Warships and all vessels other than merchant ships must
announce their passage in advance; within 100nm ships are not
allowed to stop, anchor or cruise ‘without legitimate cause’

Iran

Warships, submarines, nuclear-powered ships as well as
ships carrying nuclear or other hazardous materials require
authorisation; prohibition of ‘military activities and practices’ in
the EEZ and on the continental shelf; contiguous zone of 24nm
with security interests

Latvia

Reserves the right to regulate the passage of warships

Libya

Innocent passage to be announced in advance and allowed during
daylight hours only; four exclusion zones

Lithuania

Warships require prior authorisation if this is required by the
ﬂag state

Malaysia

Prior consent to military exercises and manoeuvres in the EEZ
and on the continental shelf
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State

Type of Rights Asserted

Maldives

Warships require prior authorisation; with regard to the EEZ,
acknowledge only the right of innocent passage; make entry of
ﬁshing and research vessels into the EEZ conditional upon prior
consent

Malta

Asserts the claim for warships to obtain prior authorisation

Mauritania

Reserves the right to restrict navigation and aviation in or above
the EEZ if this is necessary for reasons of national security

Mauritius

Warships must announce their passage; apparently makes the
passage of warships and submarines through the EEZ conditional
upon prior approval

Myanmar

Warships require prior authorisation; claims the right to restrict
the freedom of navigation and overﬂight in its exclusive EEZ zone
of 24nm with security interests

Namibia

Claims sovereign rights with regard to financial, customs,
immigration and health regulations in the EEZ as well

Nicaragua

25nm security interests, 15 days advance notiﬁcation for warships
and military aircraft, seven days for civilian trafﬁc

North Korea

62nm military zone 50nm seaward of the territorial sea; all ships
and aircraft require prior approval

Oman

Warships, nuclear-powered ships, submarines and ships carrying
hazardous loads require prior authorisation

Pakistan

Warships require prior authorisation; supertankers, nuclearpowered ships and ships carrying nuclear materials are required
to announce their passage in advance; claims authority to
regulate transit through parts of the EEZ and enact and enforce
all regulations required for controlling activities in the EEZ;
contiguous zone of 24nm with security interests

Peru

Prior consent to military exercises and manoeuvres in the EEZ
and on the continental shelf

Philippines

Expressed concern at UNCLOS III in respect of military activities
in the EEZ

Poland

Reserves the right to regulate the passage of warships

Portugal

With regard to the EEZ, acknowledges only the right of innocent
passage

Romania

Reserves the right to regulate the passage of warships

São Tomé and
Príncipe

Reserves the right to regulate the passage of warships
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State

Type of Rights Asserted

Saudi Arabia

Reserves the right to regulate the passage of nuclear-powered
ships; contiguous zone of 18nm with security interests and
navigation

Senegal

Expressed concern at UNCLOS III in respect of military activities
in the EEZ

Seychelles

Warships are required to announce their passage in advance

Slovenia

Reserves the right to regulate the passage of warships

Somalia

Warships require prior authorisation

South Korea

Warships and government ships have to announce their passage
three days in advance

Sri Lanka

Warships require prior authorisation; contiguous zone of 24nm
with security interests

St. Vincent and
Grenadines

Warships require prior authorisation

Sudan

Warships require prior authorisation; the right of innocent passage
may be suspended for security reasons; contiguous zone of 18nm
with security interests

Syria

Warships require prior authorisation; 41nm security interests

United Arab
Emirates

Warships require prior authorisation; nuclear-powered ships
and ships with nuclear or hazardous loads must announce their
passage in advance; contiguous zone of 24nm with security
interests

Uruguay

Asserts the right to prohibit military exercises in the EEZ

Venezuela

15nm national and security interests

Vietnam

Warships require authorisation to be applied for at least 30 days
prior to passage; passage restricted to three warships at a time;
contiguous zone of 24nm with security interests, submarines are
required to navigate on the surface and to show their ﬂag; aircraft
are not allowed to land on board ships or be launched from them;
on-board weapons have to be set in ‘non-operational’ mode prior
to entry into the zone

Yemen

Warships require prior authorisation; nuclear-powered ships or
ships carrying nuclear materials must announce their passage in
advance; contiguous zone of 24nm with security interests

Yugoslavia

Warships must announce their passage 24 hours in advance
Table 3: State practice – freedom of navigation and security29
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The number and scope of these restrictions raise the possibility that some aspects of
freedom of navigation under the LOSC are under pressure from States asserting some
form of ‘security jurisdiction’. The measures summarised in Table 3 clearly amount
to restrictions upon the freedom of navigation in terms of access and notiﬁcation that
are inconsistent with the LOSC. The question to ask is whether these restrictions are
undermining the LOSC protections on freedom of navigation in the manner indicated
in the NWC paper.
It is submitted that while this level of activity contrary to the LOSC is a matter for
concern, it does not amount to a new and evolving threat to the regimes of innocent,
transit and ASL passage. Most of these security restrictions are many years old, and in
any case, are not enforced by their coastal States. Certainly the United States maintains
an active Freedom of Navigation program that provides for operational challenges to
perceived unlawful restrictions.30 With some high proﬁle exceptions, most notably
the attitude of China in respect of innocent passage through its territorial sea and the
Taiwan Straits, there does not seem to be a groundswell of challenge to the existing
order beyond what has subsisted for many years. It is submitted that there is no greater
likelihood of the failure of the navigation regime in the LOSC than at any time in the
past two decades.
A number of States have also sought to assert the right to deny vessels carrying
ultra-hazardous cargoes, most notably nuclear materials for reprocessing or disposal,
passage through not only their territorial sea, but even their EEZ. These States have
often been motivated by particular incidents, where vessels have been likely to pass
through their waters on planned voyages between other States. Such voyages between
Europe and Japan have elicited responses from States in Africa, South America and
the South Paciﬁc.
The LOSC provides little direct assistance for States who wish to assert the right to
deny passage to vessels carrying ultra-hazardous cargoes. There is no indication in
the LOSC of any restriction that can be placed on navigation in the EEZ based on the
nature of the cargo. Indeed, the LOSC appears to indicate the reverse situation is the
case; that is, that ships carrying hazardous cargoes can navigate freely. This can be
seen in respect of the exercise of innocent passage for ships carrying nuclear or other
hazardous materials in article 23:
Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other
inherently dangerous or noxious substances shall, when exercising the
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, carry documents
and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships
by international agreements.
Rather than indicate duties owed to the coastal State, and the option of that State to deny
passage, article 23 indicates that special precautionary measures drawn from other
instruments ought to be complied with. No similar provision exists for the EEZ.
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The rationalisation for States seeking to exclude shipping is based upon their
jurisdiction in the EEZ over environmental matters. It is argued by these States that the
ultra-hazardous nature of the cargo poses such a threat to the environment that they
have a right to prevent the possibility of irreparable harm occurring. At the very least,
they have a right to be notiﬁed of a voyage carrying such cargo, if only to be prepared
to respond appropriately to an accident or other disaster, should one occur.
Examples of State practice from States that take the view that freedom of navigation
can be circumscribed because of a ship’s cargo cover a range of situations. As a result
of the break up of the oil tanker Prestige in November 2002, Spain and France asserted
that they would undertake inspections of singlehulled oil tankers in excess of 15 years
old passing through their EEZs, and if the vessels were found to be unseaworthy, they
would not be permitted to remain in the EEZ.31
Further examples can be drawn from international reactions to shipments of radioactive
materials around the world, particularly since the 1990s. The voyages of the Paciﬁc
Pintail, Paciﬁc Teal and Paciﬁc Swan and the Atatsuki Maru carrying highly radioactive
material attracted protests from a signiﬁcant number of States, and led States such as
Argentina, Chile, Antigua and Barbuda, Colombia, Dominican Republic, New Zealand,
South Africa and Mauritius to all purport to exclude vessels carrying radioactive
ultrahazardous cargo from their EEZs. Voyages were also condemned by Caricom,
representing the Caribbean States, and the South Paciﬁc States.32 States who have
asserted that they do not permit nuclear cargo vessels in their territorial sea or EEZ
are noted in Table 4.
Antigua and Barbuda

Malaysia

Argentina

Malta

Brazil

Nauru

Chile

New Zealand

Columbia

Oman

Dominican Republic

Papua New Guinea

Egypt

Peru

Fiji

Philippines

Guinea

Saudi Arabia

Indonesia

Singapore

Iran

South Africa

Haiti

Venezuela

Kiribati

Yemen

Table 4: States that have objected to nuclear ships passing
through their territorial seas or exclusive economic zones
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From this data, the LOSC does not appear to have exerted a similar normative impact
in the context of freedom of navigation. A large number of States purport to restrict
or regulate navigation in their territorial seas or beyond without reference to the
LOSC, and in apparent contravention of it. Much of this activity is concentrated in
the area of security, but there are signiﬁcant numbers of States also purporting to
limit or regulate the navigation rights of vessels carrying ultra-hazardous cargos, as
shown in Table 5.
Coastal State assertion of Jurisdiction

Percentage %

No position

48

Security only

34

Environmental only

9

Security and Environmental

9

Table 5: Freedom of navigation – position on restrictions by coastal States
Surprisingly, when considered in the context of coastal States only, those States seeking
restriction or regulation make up 52 per cent of the international community. This raises
the question as to whether the LOSC in the context of freedom of navigation represents
customary international law, and whether such behaviour might serve in the long term
to undermine the efﬁcacy of the LOSC in this or other areas. It would certainly be a
matter of concern that so large a proportion of the international community have taken
the view that restriction of innocent passage in certain circumstances is permissible,
although it is debatable that this is sufﬁcient to foresee the destruction of the freedom
of navigation regimes within the LOSC.

'SFFEPNPG/BWJHBUJPOJO"SDIJQFMBHPT
Freedom of navigation is particularly signiﬁcant to Australia, as many of the world’s
archipelagic States are in the Asia-Paciﬁc region. To Australia’s north, Indonesia, Papua
New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and further aﬁeld the Philippines and
Kiribati, all claim archipelagic status. Archipelagic States can claim that the waters
between their islands are part of their sovereignty, limiting passage rights to innocent
passage except along ASL. Such ASL are designated by the archipelagic States, in
consultation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), or failing a formal
declaration, are routes normally used for international navigation.
In the context of ASL passage, State practice is so limited it is not possible to undertake
the type of analysis engaged in above. Although many States in Australia’s region
are archipelagos, and have proclaimed archipelagic baselines, only Indonesia has
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proclaimed any ASL at all. This is evident from a limited survey of archipelagic State
practice in our region.
Archipelagic

Baselines

LOSC Compliant

Fiji

Yes

Yes

No

Indonesia

Yes

Yes

Partial

Kiribati

No

Unlikely

No

Papua New Guinea

ASL

Yes

Yes

No

Unofﬁcial

No

No

Solomon Islands

Yes

Yes

No

Vanuatu

Yes

Yes

No

Philippines

Table 6: Regional archipelagic State practice
A number of points can be made in relation to Table 6. First, with the exception of the
Philippines, whose practice doesn’t comply with international law, and has no support
from any other States, all the archipelagic States have baselines which comply closely
with the LOSC, if they have baselines at all. This is not suggestive of a failure of the
LOSC, but rather it is exerting a normative impact upon international practice.
Second, international practice concerning ASL passage is at a relative basic stage, even
though the LOSC has been in force for over a decade. This also does not suggest that
there is a likelihood the LOSC is under threat, as the interim position of using routes
normally used by international navigation pending the proclamation of ASL, has not
proven unacceptable to most archipelagic States in the past 13 years, and it is also
the most advantageous position for maritime States wanting freedom of navigation.
For the LOSC to be under threat of destabilisation, it would be logical to expect some
countervailing State practice.
The exception in all of this is Indonesia, which is the only archipelagic State that has
any ASL in place at all. Indonesia is committed to the concept of the archipelagic
State to a greater extent than any other State, and much of the text of the LOSC was
drafted to reﬂect Indonesian practice. However, in spite of this compliant practice, it is
signiﬁcant to note that some Indonesian perceptions of the application of international
law are often signiﬁcantly at variance with the LOSC. In the context of ASL, Indonesia
proposed in 1996 only three north-south lanes. The absence of over 10 other routes
used by international navigation led to signiﬁcant international protest from maritime
States, including Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. In this
environment, Indonesia commenced negotiations with the IMO, with Australia and the
United States participating. In 1998, Indonesia formally adopted three lanes, but these
were explicitly stated to be a ‘partial designation’, leaving the way open for maritime
States to regard any route used by international navigation as an ASL.
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Statements by Indonesia since the partial designation make it clear that it has a different
view. Senior Indonesian ofﬁcials have avoided all reference to the ASL designation as
partial and indicated that ASL passage is only possible in the lanes and not on routes
used by international navigation. Indonesia has passed legislation dealing explicitly
with ASL passage. Act No. 6 of 8 August 1996 provides for ‘peaceful crossing rights’
and ‘archipelagic sea channel crossing rights’. The former appears to equate to the
regime of innocent passage under the LOSC and Indonesia reserves the right to
‘temporarily postpone peaceful crossing’ of its territorial sea and archipelagic waters
for ‘the protection of its security, including the purpose of arms/weapons training’. For
ASL passage this is inconsistent with LOSC article 54 which applies article 44 of the
transit passage regime prohibiting suspension of passage. The Indonesian legislation
also provides that submarines and other submerged vessel are required to navigate on
the surface and show their ﬂag in this mode of passage, which is also not consistent
with ‘normal mode’ in the ASL passage regime.
Rights of ASL passage are preserved in the legislation but only in ‘specially stipulated
sea channels’. This is contrary to the negotiation of the partial designation of ASL,
which was intended to allow other lanes normally used for international navigation
to be available for ASL passage, consistent with the LOSC. If Indonesian practice in
this regard remains unique, then the threat to ASL passage as a viable legal regime is
certainly containable. If Australia and other maritime States continue to assert their
rights of ASL passage through the archipelago’s principal sea routes, and not merely
along the three designated routes, then these protests will effectively quarantine
Indonesia’s behaviour.

.JMJUBSZ0QFSBUJPOTJOUIF&YDMVTJWF&DPOPNJD;POF
Military activities and operations in the EEZ of third States was also considered in the
NWC paper. Beyond the territorial sea, the LOSC conﬁrms there is freedom of navigation
for all vessels, as well as a number of other freedoms. Article 87 provides:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down
by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises,
inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overﬂight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to
Part VI;





'3&&%0.0'/"7*("5*0/*/5)&*/%01"$*'*$3&(*0/

(d) freedom to construct artiﬁcial islands and other installations
permitted under international law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of ﬁshing, subject to the conditions laid down in
section 2;
(f) freedom of scientiﬁc research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for
the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high
seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with
respect to activities in the Area.
The impact of this provision ﬁnds its way into the regime of the EEZ by virtue
of article 58, which expressly incorporates rights of freedom of navigation and
overﬂight.
The issue of military activities, including surveillance, in the EEZ of another State is
one not directly dealt with in the LOSC.33 While the LOSC makes it plain that military
exercises and weaponry testing in the territorial sea of a coastal State would be contrary
to the regime of innocent passage, there is no equivalent restriction articulated with
respect to other maritime zones. However, neither is there any authorisation with
respect to such exercises, with there being no inclusion of military exercises or related
activities in the list of freedoms.
The lack of direct reference to military activities is not fatal to the case for the conduct
of surveillance in the EEZ of another State. The rights listed in article 87(1) are by no
means an exhaustive list, and are merely speciﬁcally enunciated examples. This is
explicit in the use of the phrase ‘inter alia’. Further, the freedoms of the high seas are
described as being subject to the conditions set down in the LOSC and ‘other rules of
international law’. The use of this language makes it clear that the LOSC is not intended
to be the only source of law in relation to the use of the high seas or EEZ.
If the case for freedom to undertake military surveillance in another State’s EEZ can
be made, it is clearly subject to some qualiﬁcation. For this the crux of the issue will
essentially turn on the meaning of the phrase ‘with due regard’. This qualiﬁcation is
applied to high seas freedoms generally in article 87(2), and it would seem logical
that one must have due regard to the rights of others while navigating through the
EEZ.34
Undertaking surveillance of another State from that State’s EEZ would not, in the
ordinary course of events, be without due regard for other ships or aircraft. In the case
of a ship, the act of navigating safely, with data gathering sensors deployed would not
necessarily interfere with other vessels’ use of the waters, unless the use of a sensor,
such as a towed array, in some way impeded ﬁshing or navigation. With aircraft, it is
submitted that the prospect of such inconvenience is even more unlikely.
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One issue that could be relevant in assessing the legitimacy of military surveillance
from the EEZ or high seas relates to whether such surveillance might constitute a
threat to international peace and security, and therefore be illegitimate. The LOSC
provides limited assistance through article 88 which provides: the high seas shall be
reserved for peaceful purposes.
A wide reading of this provision would, in theory, see great limitation of the uses of
warships on the high seas, and the potential circumscription on intelligence gathering.
When read with the Preamble, which invokes the LOSC’s role in the furtherance of peace
and security in the world,35 it suggests only peaceful uses of the sea are permissible. By
extension this could be drawn into the EEZ, as article 58 adopts the high seas freedoms
in the LOSC, and explicitly includes article 88 in this list.36 Similarly, the provisions
with respect to marine scientiﬁc research under Part XIII of the LOSC indicate that
marine scientiﬁc research can only be undertaken for peaceful purposes.37 A case
could be made that military surveillance from the high seas or another State’s EEZ
were incompatible with the LOSC.
Such an interpretation has not been favoured by many States or publicists.38 The San
Remo Manual on Armed Conﬂicts at Sea, which sought to update and consolidate the
law of armed conﬂict at sea, makes it clear that armed conﬂict at sea can take place on
the high seas, and in certain circumstances in the EEZ of a neutral State.39 The Manual
allows that provided belligerents have due regard to the uses to which another State
may wish to put its EEZ and avoid damage to the coastal State, then armed conﬂict
can occur in the EEZ of a neutral State. Clearly, if armed conﬂict can occur in another
State’s EEZ, it is difﬁcult to assert that surveillance conducted in a passive way is
contrary to international law.
First, such an interpretation would be difﬁcult to reconcile with the regime of innocent
passage that is applicable to warships. Any warship may constitute a danger to States
in its vicinity. By its very nature, such a ship is designed to engage in, or assist other
ships engage in armed conﬂict. It may be difﬁcult, if not impossible, to determine
whether a transiting warship has activated passive sensors, and certainly inconsistent
with international law to stop and board such a vessel to ascertain this, given the
sovereign immune status of the vessel.40
None of the above analysis undermines the legitimacy that voyages intended to be a
threat to international peace are unlawful. Certainly a ship purporting to exercise a
right of innocent passage that was in another State’s territorial sea for the purpose
of intelligence gathering as a prelude to armed conﬂict would not be consistent with
the LOSC. An argument could also be made that a similar voyage that remained in
the EEZ might also be unlawful, as its intention was to assist a manifestly unlawful
act. However, in such a case it is the wider behaviour and motivation that would
render such a journey unlawful, not the actual act of navigation itself. Consequently,
routine intelligence gathering ﬂights or voyages through another State’s EEZ would
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not of themselves be illegal, unless they formed a prelude to an unauthorised attack
on another State.
The NWC paper also considered brieﬂy the crash landing of a United States Navy (USN)
aircraft on Hainan Island in 2001 in the context of military activities in the EEZ. On
1 April 2001, there was a mid-air collision between a Chinese F-8-II ‘Finback’ ﬁghter
and an American EP-3E Aries aircraft, off the southern coast of China. The Chinese
ﬁghter crashed into the sea, resulting in the loss of its pilot, Wang Wei; the American
EP-3E was severely damaged, and ultimately made an emergency landing at Lingshui
airﬁeld on Hainan Island in China. The aircrew of the American aircraft were arrested,
and the incident sparked a diplomatic crisis. Thirteen days later the aircrew were
released, as was the aircraft in June 2001, when it was airlifted from China by a leased
Russian Antonov cargo aircraft.41
The collision followed a series of close passes and shadowing of American EP-3Es
by Chinese ﬁghters. The ﬁghters were attempting to deter the American aircraft
from passing close to the Chinese coast, and utilise the EP-3E’s highly sophisticated
intelligence gathering capabilities. China regarded the ﬂights as essentially ‘spy
ﬂights’ and considered them contrary to international law. The United States attitude
was that the aircraft were in international airspace, and therefore were exercising
their freedom of overﬂight in international law. Both States had been in dispute over
similar ﬂights for a considerable period of time prior to this incident, with it being the
regular practice of Chinese ﬁghter pilots in ﬂying at extremely close range to American
planes, ostensibly to deter them from continuing. Several near misses had occurred
during earlier ﬂights prior to the collision in this incident.
The collision between the United States and Chinese aircraft occurred in international
airspace as recognised by both States.42 It also took place outside a 24 nautical mile
security zone claimed by China, but not recognised by the United States.43 While the
EP-3E ultimately did enter Chinese national airspace, and landed on Chinese territory,
it was also not disputed by both States that this incursion was motivated entirely by
the distress the aircraft was in as a result of the collision. The key issue in this context
relates to the activities undertaken by the aircraft prior to the collision.
The Chinese objection to the ﬂights centred on their purpose. China considered the
activities as being overt intelligence gathering by another military power, which
were designed to provide detailed information that could be used in any conﬂict.
Such activities therefore, according to China, undermined international peace and
security of the EEZ, and therefore were not lawful.44 The Chinese Foreign Affairs
Ministry stated:
The act of the US side constitutes a violation of the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides, among other things, that
the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of a coastal State over its Exclusive
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Economic Zone, particularly its right to maintain peace, security and
good order in the waters of the Zone, shall all be respected and that a
country shall conform to the UNCLOS and other rules of international
law when exercising its freedom of the high seas.45
For China, the collision that subsequently occurred was as a result of an unlawful and
unwanted activity, that the Chinese aircraft, like others before it, was doing its best to
intimidate and deter without the use of force.
The United States’ view was that any activity that occurs in international airspace
should be treated as legal, unless it involves hostilities against another friendly power.
The use of passive systems to collect information from an area not subject to national
jurisdiction is therefore entirely legitimate. The actions by the Chinese pilots in
ﬂying at close range to American aircraft in international airspace was reckless, and
endangered their lives as well as those in the EP-3E’s, as was tragically demonstrated
on 1 April 2001.
While the Chinese objections are understandable, and in other circumstances
intelligence gathering ﬂights could be a provocative prelude to an armed conﬂict, the
American position probably more closely reﬂects the current content of international
law. Freedom of navigation in international airspace is not regulated, at least for State
aircraft. If there is no restriction on the ﬂight path on such an aircraft, it is not tenable
to restrict the use of sensors on board. To forbid its movement on the basis of its status
as a military State aircraft would effectively end all freedom of navigation, even on
the high seas, which is manifestly not the intention of the LOSC, State practice or the
International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case.46
Again, the threat posed to existing international structures is present, but stable, insofar
as it has not signiﬁcantly increased in recent years. Although China would be reluctant
to concede it, the US position in respect of the crash landing of its aircraft on Hainan
Island was probably borne out by events, and suggests that a robust approach to the
assertion of maritime rights can be effective in maintaining international regimes.

.BSJUJNF4FDVSJUZ
The NWC paper also considered some maritime security issues, although they are
not explored to the same extent as those in respect of navigation. This emphasis is
surprising, as it is in the area of maritime security that most development within the
law of the sea has taken place in the last decade.
In the years since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States,
there have been a number of developments that potentially have implications with
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respect to boarding ships at sea. The implications of each of these measures will be
considered in turn.

5IF*OUFSOBUJPOBM4IJQBOE1PSU'BDJMJUZ4FDVSJUZ$PEF
The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code has been instituted under
the auspices of the IMO to provide for greater security for ships and port facilities
in an environment more conscious of the risks of terrorist attack.47 In the context of
boarding and interdiction of vessels, the ISPS Code does not provide for boarding of
vessels at sea by States other than the ﬂag State.

46"$POWFOUJPO
Negotiated in the wake of the hijacking of the cruise liner Achille Lauro in the 1980s, the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(SUA Convention) provides a framework for dealing with terrorist and like acts against
ships at sea.48 It was negotiated in part because the traditional deﬁnition of piracy,
as reﬂected in LOSC article 110 required the activities to have been committed for
private ends, which may not include terrorist acts as perpetrators might be motivated
by a political cause.
Parties to the SUA Convention have a wide jurisdiction to deal with offences against
shipping, including seizing a ship, performing acts of violence against individuals on a
ship, or damaging a ship or its cargo to endanger its safe navigation. While jurisdiction
to make laws to create offences for these activities is widely construed, being based on
ﬂag or the physical presence of a vessel in the territorial sea, or even attempted coercion
of the State concerned or its nationals, the SUA Convention does not authorise boarding
of a ship at sea by any State other than the ﬂag State. Further, the Preamble of the SUA
Convention provides ‘matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed
by the rules and principles of general international law’, which would appear to limit
non-ﬂag State intervention to acts covered under article 110 of the LOSC, which would
essentially be acts of piracy. The only mechanism that might permit another State to
have a role is in article 8 of the SUA Convention, which provides the master of a vessel
may hand individuals over to a ‘receiving State’, other than the ﬂag State.
The adoption of the SUA Convention by States was initially slow, but gathered pace
strongly in the years following the 2001 terrorist attacks. Since that time, further
diplomatic efforts to extend the scope of the Convention have been pursued within the
IMO, leading to the adoption of a Protocol to the SUA Convention in late 2005.49
The principal focus of the 2005 SUA Protocol is on weapons of mass destruction and
their non-proliferation, but the amendments also create additional offences of using a
ship as a platform for terrorist activities,50 as well as the transportation of an individual
who has committed an offence under the SUA Convention,51 or any of another nine
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listed anti-terrorism conventions.52 However, for the purposes of this discussion article
8bis potentially widens the scope for third party boarding of ships and needs to be
speciﬁcally considered.
The operative provision for a third party boarding of a vessel at sea is article 8bis(5)
of the 2005 SUA Protocol. It provides:
5. Whenever law enforcement or other authorized officials of a
State Party (‘the requesting Party’) encounter a ship ﬂying the ﬂag or
displaying marks of registry of another State Party (‘the ﬁrst Party’)
located seaward of any State’s territorial sea, and the requesting Party
has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a person on board
the ship has been, is or is about to be involved in the commission of an
offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater, and the requesting
Party desires to board,
(a) it shall request, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 that
the ﬁrst Party conﬁrm the claim of nationality, and
(b) if nationality is conﬁrmed, the requesting Party shall ask
the ﬁrst Party (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ﬂag State’) for
authorisation to board and to take appropriate measures with
regard to that ship which may include stopping, boarding and
searching the ship, its cargo and persons on board, and questioning
the persons on board in order to determine if an offence set forth
in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to
be committed, and
(c) the ﬂag State shall either:
(i) authorize the requesting Party to board and to take
appropriate measures set out in subparagraph (b), subject to
any conditions it may impose in accordance with paragraph
7; or
(ii) conduct the boarding and search with its own law
enforcement or other ofﬁcials; or
(iii) conduct the boarding and search together with the
requesting Party, subject to any conditions it may impose in
accordance with paragraph 7; or
(iv) decline to authorize a boarding and search.
The requesting Party shall not board the ship or take measures set out in
subparagraph (b) without the express authorisation of the ﬂag State.
This provision provides that a third State may board after ascertaining the nationality of
a vessel suspected of committing an offence under article 3 or its related amendments,
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notifying the ﬂag State and obtaining the consent of the ﬂag State. In the absence of
this consent from the ﬂag State, a boarding cannot take place. A mechanism does
exist to try to avoid intransigence by the ﬂag State, where the ﬂag State may lodge a
declaration in article 8bis granting a right to board four hours after request to board,
or a declaration permitting boarding by other State parties.
If evidence of a past, current or imminent offence is discovered in the course of a
boarding, the ﬂag State still retains jurisdiction, but it may authorise the boarding State
to detain the vessel, its cargo and crew pending further instructions. It is clear from
the text that the ﬂag State is to remain in control, and that a boarding and subsequent
discovery of an offence does not act as a basis for the boarding State to take over the
matter. Article 8bis in part states:
7. The flag State, consistent with the other provisions of this
Convention, may subject its authorisation under paragraph 5 or 6
to conditions, including obtaining additional information from the
requesting Party, and conditions relating to responsibility for and
the extent of measures to be taken. No additional measures may
be taken without the express authorisation of the ﬂag State, except
when necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of persons or
where those measures derive from relevant bilateral or multilateral
agreements.
8. For all boardings pursuant to this article, the ﬂag State has the right
to exercise jurisdiction over a detained ship, cargo or other items and
persons on board, including seizure, forfeiture, arrest and prosecution.
However, the ﬂag State may, subject to its constitution and laws, consent
to the exercise of jurisdiction by another State having jurisdiction under
article 6.
The practical upshot of these measures is that State parties to the SUA Convention
and 2005 SUA Protocol, when the latter enters into force, will be able to board each
other’s vessels at sea, with each other’s consent. This consent may be expedited through
declarations being made, but will still be required to found any further action. The
2005 Protocol also envisages cooperation between States with respect to how such
boardings and subsequent action might take place.53

1SPMJGFSBUJPO4FDVSJUZ*OJUJBUJWF
The Proliferation Security Initiative is an informal international understanding
that provides a basis for cooperative action at sea to deal with vessels suspected of
carrying weapons of mass destruction or related equipment to non-state actors. It is
not a treaty and therefore is not binding, but rather a statement of intention indicated
by States, indicating how they plan to cooperate and what steps might be taken to
intercept a suspected cargo. A number of States have indicated their strong support
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for the Proliferation Security Initiative, while many more have shown an interest in
participating.54
In the context of boarding and interdiction, there has been a Statement of Interdiction
Principles made by the Proliferation Security Initiative States, and a portion of this is
directly relevant to the boarding and interdiction of vessels at sea:
Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding
cargoes of [weapons of mass destruction], their delivery systems, or
related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit
and consistent with their obligations under international law and
frameworks, to include:
(a) Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes
to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and
not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
(b) At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown
by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel
ﬂying their ﬂag in their internal waters or territorial seas or areas
beyond the territorial seas of any other state that is reasonably
suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or nonstate actors of proliferation concerns, and to seize such cargoes
that are identiﬁed.
(c) To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag
vessels by other states and to the seizure of such [weapons of mass
destruction]-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identiﬁed
by such states.
(d) To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in
their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when
declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern
and to seize such cargoes that are identiﬁed; and (2) to enforce
conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal
waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying
such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to
boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.55
This Statement provides for two distinct jurisdictional bases for boarding a vessel. The
ﬁrst is ﬂag State jurisdiction, where a ﬂag State undertakes to board and search vessels
ﬂying its ﬂag reasonably suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction or related
material and to seize such cargo if found. This is clearly consistent with international
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law, as such enforcement is restricted to the ﬂag State’s waters, or waters beyond its
jurisdiction, but outside the territorial sea of another State.
Flag State jurisdiction is also available to third States where the ﬂag State undertakes
to ‘seriously consider’ providing consent to the boarding States to board, search and
if necessary seize the cargo. It is signiﬁcant that while the possibility of third State
action is clearly contemplated, States supporting the Statement are only obliged to
‘seriously consider’ rather than to acquiesce to a third State boarding.
The second basis of jurisdiction for boarding and interdiction is territorial jurisdiction,
where the ﬂag State of the vessel concerned is not relevant. This has the coastal State
asserting jurisdiction over a vessel because of its presence in the territorial sea,
without necessarily obtaining the consent of the ﬂag State. There has been signiﬁcant
academic debate over the legality of this territorial basis for stopping and boarding
ships, and seizing cargoes. Certainly, it would not prima facie seem consistent with a
right of innocent passage and the restrictions on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction
by a coastal State over vessels passing through their territorial sea.
While a number of arguments can be raised in support of the legality of such an
interception, including the right of a coastal State to act in its individual or collective
self-defence, there has not been support for this mode of action to date in the United
Nations Security Council. The Council may make a resolution pursuant to Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter, if it feels the application of force would assist in combating
a threat to international peace and security, and therefore could provide legitimate
authority for a coastal State to stop and board a suspect vessel in its territorial sea,
or even outside it.56 Security Council Resolution 1540 urges States to prohibit the
transit of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors, but it does not create any
positive duty upon States to undertake interdiction of such vessels. The Resolution
only authorises such action as is ‘consistent with international law’,57 and therefore
boarding a suspect vessel in the territorial sea may not be legitimate.
One issue that has occurred with the development of the PSI has been the conclusion
of ship boarding agreements between the United States and a number of ﬂag States
with open registries. These agreements permit the United States to stop and board
vessels ﬂagged in the participating States, often with short term notice and permission
periods, in order to search and seize weapons of mass destruction or associated delivery
systems. The agreements are mostly reciprocal, so in theory participating States could
exercise identical powers over suspect United States ﬂagged vessels, but practically
speaking the prospect of this occurring is remote. At the time of writing, seven such
agreements had been concluded, with another yet to enter into force. The agreements
are with Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Croatia, Belize, Cyprus and Malta, with
an agreement with Mongolia yet to enter into force.58
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3FHJPOBMJOJUJBUJWFT
The NWC paper refers to regional developments as being signiﬁcant and increasingly
common. This is a logical and reasonable assessment of international practice in a
number of areas, most notably in ﬁsheries management and environmental protection.
Similar structures with respect to security may also emerge in the years to come,
something which is already happening in speciﬁc subject areas within Australia’s
region.59
In terms of non-proliferation, the NWC paper poses a relatively pessimistic future with
up to 30 nuclear armed States and concern that the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons 1968 will collapse under the pressure caused by the emergence of
new nuclear States. It should be noted that the workshop on which the NWC paper is
based took place in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test, and in an environment
where UN responses to the nuclear activities of North Korea and Iran were proving
ineffectual. In the months since November 2006, North Korea has apparently accepted a
diplomatic solution to bring about nuclear disarmament.60 While the situation with Iran
remains tense, the prognostication of the collapse of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons 1968 is much less likely than previously.61
Regional responses to ocean issues are, as was pointed out in the NWC paper, signiﬁcant
in a number of areas, most notably in the context of ﬁsheries and environmental
protection. Australian participation in regional arrangements of this nature is common,
and sees national participation across a number of instruments. These are listed in
Table 7.
Year

Australian
Participation

Plant Protection Agreement for the Asia and
Paciﬁc Region

1956

Yes

Treaty

The Antarctic Treaty

1959

Yes

Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals

1972

Yes

Convention on Conservation of Nature in the
South Paciﬁc

1976

Yes

South Paciﬁc Forum Fisheries Agency
Convention

1979

Yes

Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources

1980

Yes

South Paciﬁc Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

1985

Yes
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Year

Australian
Participation

Convention for the Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment of the South Paciﬁc
Region, Noumea

1986

Yes

Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the
South Paciﬁc Region by Dumping

1986

Yes

Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating
Pollution Emergencies in the South Paciﬁc
Region

1986

Yes

South Paciﬁc Fisheries Convention

1987

Yes

Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing With
Long Drift Nets In the South Paciﬁc

1989

Yes

Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental
Protection

1991

Yes

Convention for the Conservation of Southern
Blueﬁn Tuna

1992

Yes

Agreement for the establishment of the Indian
Ocean Tuna Commission

1993

Yes

Agreement establishing the South Paciﬁc
Regional Environmental Programme

1993

Yes

Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum
Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive
Wastes and to Control the Transboundary
Movement and Management of Hazardous
Wastes within the South Paciﬁc Region (The
Waigani Convention)

1995

Yes

South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement

2006

Treaty

South Paciﬁc Regional Fisheries Management
Convention

-

Not yet in force
Under
negotiation

Table 7: Regional environmental and ﬁsheries treaties
It is evident from this list that Australia has been heavily engaged in the region in
participating in regional ﬁsheries and environmental agreements. Australia is equally
signiﬁcantly engaged in security cooperation throughout the region, with formal
relationships existing with New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea
and most recently Indonesia. Were there to be regional developments in responding
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to security or other measures at a regional level, Australia would certainly be engaged
in those developments, and would in all likelihood play a leading role.

3FGVHFFT
The NWC paper also expressed concern at the stability of the regime for refugees, in
the face of large movements of displaced persons. At international law, the treatment
of refugees claiming asylum is, like the duty to render assistance, of great age, and
has been incorporated into modern treaty law. The Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees 1951 and its 1967 Protocol deal with the obligations upon State Parties,
including Australia, in dealing with refugees arriving in its territory.62 A refugee is
deﬁned under article 1 as a person with a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
who is outside their country of nationality, and is unwilling or unable to seek its help,
and is unwilling to return. Most importantly is the obligation upon States under article
33 of the Refugees Convention, which contains the non-refoulement principle:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
This provision restricts a State that has individuals with refugee-status from deporting
those individuals to where they might be persecuted, and has the effect of restricting
the similar expulsion of any person claiming such status at least until that claim has
been reviewed.
The standard which is set by international law is determined domestically by State
Parties, and in the case of Australia is found in the operation of the Migration Act 1958.63
This Act adopts the international standard, and puts in place review mechanisms, which
themselves can be subject to administrative review by a specialised agency. These
procedures typically take many months, and as a result detention centres have been
established at a variety of locations to house asylum-seekers pending the resolution
of their status.
While inﬂuxes of people claiming refugee status have, from time to time, placed these
systems under pressure, there is little reason to suggest that international law will
change to meet the demands of larger movements of people. In times of war in parts of
Africa, hundreds of thousands if not millions of people have been displaced, bringing
about vast humanitarian crises. While these crises are serious and have caused
tremendous difﬁculties for the receiving States and the international community, there
has been no serious effort by States to revisit the content of the Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees 1951.64
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3FHJPOBM1SBDUJDFJOUIF-BXPGUIF4FB
Regional practice in relation to the law of the sea varies greatly, and is signiﬁcant
to Australia insofar as it may negatively impact upon freedom of navigation through
the region. The assessment of regional practice contained here is brief, and will be
in the form of a short summary of each State’s practice. It is intended that detailed
summaries of regional State practice in the law of the sea will be produced in a
subsequent work.

3FHJPOBM"UUJUVEFTUP4FDVSJUZ+VSJTEJDUJPO
All States in Australia’s region claim the full range of maritime zones, to the maximum
extent permissible, with the exception of Singapore, which still only claims a three
nautical mile territorial sea. As such, all of those considered below have a 12 nautical
mile territorial sea and 200 nautical mile EEZ. Further, these zones are applied to all
areas which they claim, including the Spratly Islands and elsewhere.

$IJOB
China has a restrictive law of the sea practice, particularly with respect to freedom of
navigation. Its restrictive approach is exacerbated by the use of territorial sea baselines
that are in excess of what is permitted under the LOSC, which have the effect of greatly
extending Chinese jurisdiction out to sea. Illegal basepoints have been used, and the
baselines themselves enclose coastal areas which are neither deeply indented, masked
by fringing islands, or possess any other justiﬁcation.
Chinese legislation requires that warships receive prior authorisation before entering
Chinese territorial waters. Such a requirement is inconsistent with the rules for
innocent passage. China also asserts a right to a security jurisdiction within its
contiguous zone. Since the contiguous zone under the LOSC limits jurisdiction to ﬁscal,
immigration, sanitary and customs jurisdiction, as assertion over matters pertaining
to security is also contrary to international law.
China also requires notice of shipments of waste through its territorial sea and EEZ.
While there are special requirements for the shipment of nuclear materials through
the territorial sea, these do not extend to the EEZ, and do not apply to all types of waste
passing through the territorial sea.
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'JKJ
Fiji’s claims of jurisdiction over the territorial sea and other maritime zones reﬂect
international law closely, with legislation guaranteeing the right of all vessels to
exercise a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Its archipelagic
baselines are largely in accordance with international law, and although legislative
provisions to do so exist, no ASL have been proclaimed.

*OEJB
India claims the full range of maritime zones in accordance with international law;
however, its practice with respect to foreign vessels and military exercises is restrictive
and in breach of international law. India has a requirement of notice to be given by
foreign warships prior to entering its territorial sea.
In addition, India also asserts a security jurisdiction over the contiguous zone. Since the
contiguous zone under the LOSC limits jurisdiction to ﬁscal, immigration, sanitary and
customs jurisdiction, as assertion over matters pertaining to security is also contrary
to international law.
India also seeks to restrict access and activities in its EEZ. It requires prior permission
to be given of any military exercises or manoeuvres taking place in its EEZ. India
also requires 24 hour notice of vessels carrying ‘dangerous goods and chemicals, oil,
noxious liquid and harmful substances and radioactive material’. There is no basis in
international law for these measures.

*OEPOFTJB
It is signiﬁcant to note that Indonesian perceptions of the application of international
law are often signiﬁcantly at variance with more widely accepted interpretations.
This is most clearly seen in relation to ASL. After the initial Indonesian proposal in
1996 of designating only three North-South lanes, and no others, there was signiﬁcant
international protest from maritime States, including Australia, the United States, the
United Kingdom and Japan. As a result of this protest, when Indonesia commenced
negotiations with the IMO, Australia and the United States participated in the
discussions. In the ﬁnal wash-up, in 1998, Indonesia was able to keep its three lanes,
but these were explicitly stated to be a ‘partial designation’, leaving the way open for
maritime States to regard any route used by international navigation as an ASL.
However, statements by Indonesia since the partial designation make it clear that
it has a different view. The statement released by the Indonesian Foreign Minister
immediately following the adoption of the ASL does not use the word partial anywhere in
the text, and there was no reference to any of the discussions with other States although
the history of lodgement of the proposal with IMO was referred to. In unreported
statements in Jakarta in 2003, an Indonesian Foreign Ministry ofﬁcial stated that the
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designation should not be treated as partial, and that ASL passage ought to be limited
only to the designated lanes.
Indonesia has promulgated legislation dealing explicitly with ASL passage. Act No. 6 of
8 August 1996 provides in Chapter III for ‘peaceful crossing rights’ and ‘archipelagic sea
channel crossing rights’. The former appears to equate to the regime of innocent passage
under the LOSC. In accordance with the regime of innocent passage under LOSC
article 25, Indonesia reserves the right to ‘temporarily postpone peaceful crossing’ of
its territorial sea and archipelagic waters for ‘the protection of its security, including
the purpose of arms/weapons training’. Submarines and other submerged vehicles are
required to navigate on the surface and show their ﬂag in this mode of passage.
The part of Chapter III dealing with ASL passage is of greater concern. It provides for
such passage according to the LOSC, but only at ‘specially stipulated sea channels’.
This is contrary to the negotiation of the partial designation of ASL, which was intended
to allow other lanes to be used. In the absence of a designated ASL, the LOSC permits
routes normally used for international navigation to be used for ASL passage. Since
the three existing Indonesian lanes are not intended to be a complete designation,
it follows other routes used for international navigation retain their status as being
used as ASL. ASL passage cannot be validly suspended by the archipelagic State at
any time, and is also applicable to aircraft, which is not the case for innocent passage.
Further, Australia takes the view, along with other maritime States, that ASL passage
allows transit in ‘normal mode’, which includes submerged submarine transit, and the
undertaking of all usual shipboard activities and security measures.

.BMBZTJB
Malaysia relies heavily upon the beneﬁts to its economy arising from the freedom
of navigation through the Malacca Strait, and accordingly its legislation upholds the
freedom of navigation in a manner consistent with international law.
More controversially, Malaysia has taken the view that military exercises in its EEZ
require Malaysian consent. There is nothing in the LOSC that indicates that any such
jurisdiction exists. The only restrictions imposed upon States seeking to undertake
military exercises in another State’s EEZ is to have due regard for the uses of others,
and to do nothing which impedes the coastal State from exercising its jurisdiction.
As such, while exercises could not be undertaken in a fashion to endanger a ﬁshing
ﬂeet or oil platform, there is no justiﬁcation for the blanket permission required by
Malaysia.

1BQVB/FX(VJOFB
Papua New Guinea is an archipelagic State, in spite of its mainland territory sharing
a land boundary with Indonesia. There is no indication of any assertion of jurisdiction
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by Papua New Guinea that would be contrary to the LOSC. Its archipelagic baselines
are largely in accordance with international law, although the formal baselines were
only declared in 2002. No ASL have been proclaimed.

1BLJTUBO
Pakistan does require notiﬁcation of foreign warships entering its territorial sea, even
if such vessels are exercising a right of innocent passage. There is no requirement
in international law for such notiﬁcation to be given where a warship is exercising a
right of innocent passage, and Pakistan’s legislation on this point has been the subject
of protest by the United States. Pakistan has a contiguous zone which extends to
24 nautical miles. The extent of the zone is consistent with international law. Pakistan
also purports to possess jurisdiction over ﬁscal, immigration, sanitary, customs and
security matters. Only the ﬁrst four of these are consistent with the LOSC, while there
is no justiﬁcation for security.

1IJMJQQJOFT
The Philippines largely complies with the requirements of the LOSC with respect to
the transit of vessels, although it has expressed concern over military activities in its
EEZ. However, there are no speciﬁc provisions limiting military vessels transiting
through the archipelago. Contrary to the LOSC, the Philippines has proclaimed its
territorial waters to be all those waters contained in what is usually described as the
Treaty Limits Box. This large Box extends to as much as 350 kilometres away from
the coast of the Philippines, and is therefore not permissible at international law.
Australia and other States have protested the maintenance of the Box, even though the
Philippines has indicated it will not enforce rights in the Box in a manner inconsistent
with the LOSC.

4PMPNPO*TMBOET
The Solomon Islands is yet to seek the promulgation of archipelagic sea lanes. Section
10 of the Delimitation of Marine Waters Act 1978 does provide that the relevant Solomons
minister can proclaim ASL in accordance with international law, but until this takes
place, routes normally used by international navigation may be used for ASL passage.
Rights of navigation in accordance with international law are explicitly guaranteed in
the Delimitation of Marine Waters Act 1978.

4SJ-BOLB
Sri Lanka claims the full range of maritime zones in accordance with international
law; however, its practice with respect to foreign vessels and military exercises is
restrictive and in breach of international law. Sri Lanka has a requirement of notice to
be given by foreign warships prior to entering its territorial sea.
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In addition, Sri Lanka also asserts a security jurisdiction over the contiguous zone.
Since the contiguous zone under the LOSC limits jurisdiction to ﬁscal, immigration,
sanitary and customs jurisdiction, as assertion over matters pertaining to security is
also contrary to international law.
Sri Lanka also seeks to restrict military activities in its EEZ. It requires prior permission
to be given of any military exercises or manoeuvres taking place in its EEZ. There is
no basis in international law for these measures.

5BJXBO
In the international community, most States do not recognise the government of Taiwan,
but rather recognises the sovereignty over the island being vested in the People’s
Republic of China. Some aspects of the law of the sea practice of the government in
Taipei are not consistent with international law. Taiwan provides that foreign civilian
ships are entitled to exercise a right of innocent passage if such a right is available to
Taiwanese vessels under the reciprocity principle. Foreign military and government
vessels are required to give notice of passage through the Taiwanese territorial sea.
Such a requirement is not consistent with international law.
Outside the territorial sea, Taiwan is mostly compliant with international law, with
the exception of the waters of the Taiwan Strait outside its territorial sea. It provides
the Taiwanese government can regulate foreign transiting vessels in the Taiwan Strait
used for international navigation on the following subjects:
1. the maintenance of navigation safety and the regulation of maritime trafﬁc
2. the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the environment
3. the prohibition of ﬁshing
4. the prevention and punishment of loading or unloading of any commodity, currency
or person in contravention of the customs, ﬁscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations of the Republic of China.
While the second and third are permissible, and the fourth permisible in the contiguous
zone, the ﬁrst goes beyond what is allowable under international law.

5IBJMBOE
Thailand has also acted entirely with the LOSC in relation to issues of passage. Thailand
has explicitly stated that it supports the existing passage regimes with respect to
innocent passage through the territorial sea, and transit passage through international
straits. Further, it has rejected the notion that warships exercising such passage rights
ought to give prior notiﬁcation of their transits. The Thai position was incorporated into
a statement by the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made in August 1995.
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7BOVBUV
Vanuatu’s claims of jurisdiction over the territorial sea reﬂect international law quite
closely, even to the extent of guaranteeing in legislation the right of all vessels to
exercise a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Its archipelagic baselines
are in accordance with international law, but no ASL have been proclaimed.

7JFUOBN
Vietnam claims a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, in accordance with the LOSC. However,
Decree No. 30-CP, issued in 1980, requires a 30 day authorisation period by foreign
warships and ‘military ships’ to receive permission to exercise a right of innocent
passage through Vietnamese waters. Once granted, there is a 48 hour pre-entry
notiﬁcation required. Non-military vessels must seek permission with a minimum
of 24 hours notice, after seeking permission seven days in advance, unless they are
not commercial vessels, in which case the notiﬁcation increases to 48 hours and the
permission to 15 days. Vietnam also claims that no more than three warships of the
same nationality may be present in its territorial sea, nor may they stay on visits for
more than one week.
Vietnam also has speciﬁed routes which foreign vessels must follow, and designated
‘forbidden areas’ which these vessels may not enter. Since the designated routes
are not navigational measures set up in consultation with the IMO, such as a trafﬁc
separation scheme, they are also unlawful, in the territorial sea. While navigation in
the territorial sea is, at international law, subject to the regime of innocent passage,
there is no restriction as to route other than being continuous and expedition, unless
there are navigational measures such as a trafﬁc separation scheme. Permanently
forbidden areas are only legitimate if they are in internal waters.
Vietnam claims similar security rights for the contiguous zone, as it does in the
territorial sea. For warships, notice requirements are again asserted, as well as a
requirement for weapons to be in a ‘non-operative position’ and ammunition locked
away and gun barrels covered. Submarines are obliged to navigate on the surface and
show their ﬂag.
All of these measures are contrary to international law. Ships have freedom of navigation
outside the territorial sea, and as long as they pose no direct threat to shipping or
the coastal State, can exercise with their weapons. Submarines are only obliged to
navigate on the surface when exercising a right of innocent passage in the territorial
sea, and therefore there is no requirement for such navigation in the contiguous zone.
The notiﬁcation requirements are, as with the territorial sea, without foundation at
international law.
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Restrictions on international navigation by coastal States present a serious threat to
Australia’s international maritime interests. Any limitations upon the movement of
vessels engaged in international trade around the region would have a profoundly
negative effect upon the Australian economy. Ensuring the existing freedom of
navigation regime is retained and supported worldwide should be viewed as an essential
foreign policy objective for Australia.
There are a number of ways in which an increasingly restrictive navigation regime
internationally might affect Australian interests. First, ADF ships, submarines and
aircraft might ﬁnd their access to certain areas of the ocean and super-adjacent airspace
becoming restricted or subject to unacceptable limitations. Prior entry notiﬁcation,
navigation on the surface for submarines, and the restriction of international straits
and ASL are not currently permissible at international law, and would limit the ADF’s
operational effectiveness throughout the region. It could also impede the transit of allied
navies in times of heightened tension or armed conﬂict, also hampering the efforts of
coalitions of which Australia is a part.
Second, Australian commercial shipping, and other ﬂag carriers of Australian exports
and imports use many important sea routes that pass through international straits,
archipelagic waters or areas subject to claims of security jurisdiction by the littoral
State. The interruption of these commercial vessels, even for a short time, would have
a very detrimental impact upon the Australian economy. Consequently, it is vital for
the right of freedom of navigation to be upheld and maintained for commercial trafﬁc
as well as military.
Given the assertion of jurisdiction by coastal States beyond the ambit of the LOSC, it
appears to be motivated most commonly by a desire to improve maritime security,
as most of the restrictions relate to the activities of warships, and, to a lesser extent,
military aircraft. Most coastal States, like Australia, also draw substantial beneﬁt
from the freedom of navigation, so have not, to date, been over zealous in asserting
their security regimes. An exception to this would be North Korea, but fortunately, its
waters are far from maritime trade routes which are of signiﬁcance to Australia. While
there has been some tension with China with respect to transits through the Taiwan
Straits, there is no indication this has prevented a strengthening of the relationships,
diplomatic and defence-based, that have grown over the last decade, and will likely
continue to grow under the new Rudd Government in Australia.
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A number of responses to assertions of security jurisdiction by coastal States, or other
restrictions on freedom of navigation, are possible. First, Australia could engage in
a systematic program of diplomatic protest in respect of regional maritime claims,
which cannot be justiﬁed under international law. To date, there has been little
diplomatic activity directed at maritime claims by other States, and to allow claims to
go unchallenged over a long period of time weakens Australia’s position. While protests
have been made in respect of particular areas which were relevant because of an
ongoing operation, such as Australia’s protest to Iran over the legality of its territorial
sea baselines in the Persian Gulf, other areas of greater strategic importance, but not
the site of extant conﬂict or activity, have not been the subject of protest.
Second, Australia might seek to take a leaf out of the United States’ book and initiate
a Freedom of Navigation program. The Freedom of Navigation program requires the
USN to be cognisant of maritime claims disputed by the United States, and to, where
possible, operationally assert rights of freedom of navigation or military exercise, as
appropriate. As such USN vessels will regularly detour into waters subject to claim or
restriction by coastal States, to ensure there is a practical demonstration of the United
States’ failure to accept these claims and restrictions. The Freedom of Navigation
program is applied to allies’ claims as well as other States, and is the subject of annual
reporting to Congress by the USN and the State Department.
Freedom of navigation efforts become more complex when asserted on behalf of
Australian commercial interests. First, innocent passage permits vessels to pass
continuously and expeditiously through the territorial sea of a coastal State, and
prohibits activities that are not incidental to passage. Transit and ASL passage have
similar restrictions. RAN ships accompanying Australian ﬂagged vessels through the
territorial sea of another State would not be in a position to stop or request to board
other transiting vessels, including Australian vessels, unless they were assisting such
vessels when in danger or distress.65
Outside of the territorial sea of third States and of Australian waters, there are issues
with respect to commercial vessels being boarded by the ADF. International law does
not permit a State to board another State’s vessels without its consent on the high
seas, save in extremely limited circumstances. The provision of operational support
to assert any freedom of navigation, would therefore have to be done with the express
consent and cooperation of a ﬂag State, to ensure that Australian personnel could get
aboard supported vessels if necessary.
On balance, while some States assert jurisdiction over maritime areas, there is nothing
to suggest that to date this has impacted negatively on Australian warships’ and other
vessels’ access to important ocean passages. Developments in the law of the sea to
date, while requiring monitoring, also do not suggest that the navigational regimes
are being fatally undermined. The positive assertion through diplomatic means and
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regular ship transits would not impact negatively on the present situation, and would
demonstrate an Australian commitment to uphold the existing law.

.BSJUJNF&OGPSDFNFOU
States through their warships or other government vessels, including coastguard
vessels, may be able at international law to assert a right to board a vessel at sea. This
may be through an assertion of jurisdiction over the vessel, the permission of the ﬂag
State, or through a mere right to visit the vessel. If the vessel in question refuses to
comply to permit a boarding to take place, the question is raised as to what degree of
force may be imposed in order to compel compliance.
The LOSC says very little as to what level of force may be imposed by a State in order to
uphold its rights and jurisdiction at sea. The LOSC notes that the exercise of jurisdiction
should be by a warship or other marked government vessel, which may imply some
degree of force might be used, as most vessels ﬁtting these descriptions are armed,
but it is submitted that this is too much to read into the LOSC. As the LOSC does not
deal with the issue, it is necessary to apply older principles of international law.
There have been a number of cases dealing with offshore maritime enforcement
and the use of force. In the case of I’m Alone, a joint commission dealt with matters
surrounding the pursuit and destruction of a Canadian vessel suspected of smuggling
alcohol during Prohibition by the United States Coast Guard. The Commission, after
dealing with issues of hot pursuit, held that the sinking of the I’m Alone, which had
offered no threat to the pursuing coast guard vessels, was contrary to international
law. The Commission was satisﬁed that a pursuing vessel might use necessary and
reasonable force for the purpose of boarding, searching, seizing and bringing to port a
vessel, and if in such circumstances the vessel was to sink, then that might acceptable,
providing the sinking was incidental to necessary and reasonable action. However,
where an unarmed vessel had been deliberately sunk, such action would be contrary
to international law.66
In the case of the Red Crusader, an international inquiry between the United Kingdom
and Denmark had to consider an incident between a Scottish trawler and a Danish
ﬁsheries patrol vessel in the waters around the Faroe Islands. After having been stopped
by the Danish patrol vessel Neils Ebbesen on suspicion of ﬁshing, the Red Crusader
ﬂed, taking two Danish crew members with her. The Neils Ebbesen gave chase, and
ultimately ﬁred upon the Red Crusader, initially with 40mm gun ﬁre into mast, radar
scanner and lights, and then into the ship’s stern. When this proved ineffective, Neils
Ebbesen ﬁred 127mm solid shot into the Red Crusader, with the incident brought to a
close with the intervention of a Royal Navy vessel interposing itself between the two
vessels. The Court of Inquiry held that the force used against the Red Crusader was
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contrary to international law. It considered the ﬁring of solid shot into the Red Crusader
without warning, and ﬁring in such a way as to endanger human life exceeded the
legitimate use of force.67
The most recent signiﬁcant international case dealing with the use of force in
enforcement actions at sea was that of the MV Saiga (No.2) before the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The Saiga was a tanker, registered in St Vincent and
the Grenadines, that was engaged in bunkering ﬁshing vessels off the coast of Guinea
in 1997. A Guinean patrol vessel pursued the Saiga and ﬁred into it, although it was
disputed before the Tribunal what calibre of weapon was used. The Tribunal held that
the level of force used by Guinea was excessive and stated:
155. In considering the force used by Guinea in the arrest of the Saiga,
the Tribunal must take into account the circumstances of the arrest in
the context of the applicable rules of international law. Although the
Convention does not contain express provisions on the use of force in
the arrest of ships, international law, which is applicable by virtue of
article 293 of the Convention, requires that the use of force must be
avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must not
go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.
Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they
do in other areas of international law.
156. These principles have been followed over the years in law
enforcement operations at sea. The normal practice used to stop a
ship at sea is ﬁrst to give an auditory or visual signal to stop, using
internationally recognized signals. Where this does not succeed, a
variety of actions may be taken, including the ﬁring of shots across the
bows of the ship. It is only after the appropriate actions fail that the
pursuing vessel may, as a last resort, use force.68
This places a substantial restriction on the use of force in maritime enforcement. Aside
from an exception in relation to self defence, which was touched upon in MV Saiga
(No.2), but deemed inapplicable by the Tribunal in the circumstances, it certainly makes
it explicit that the use of force is only permissible after a variety of other measures
have been implemented, including warning shots across the bow. Together with Red
Crusader and I’m Alone, it makes it most unlikely that the application of force that
could potentially cause physical harm to humans in the arrest of a vessel at sea can
be lawfully used.
Such an approach is largely duplicated in the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention.
Article 8bis(9) provides:
9. When carrying out the authorized actions under this article, the use
of force shall be avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of
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its ofﬁcials and persons on board, or where the ofﬁcials are obstructed
in the execution of the authorized actions. Any use of force pursuant
to this article shall not exceed the minimum degree of force which is
necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.
It is signiﬁcant that the language used in the last sentence of this paragraph is identical
to the phrase used by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in paragraph
155 of its joint judgment in the MV Saiga.
Notably, where a boarding is undertaken under article 8bis(10) of the 2005 SUA
Protocol, the scope of the duty is more fully described, perhaps reﬂecting the heightened
concern of States in regard the exercise of a power to board and arrest against their
ﬂagged vessels:
10. Safeguards:
(a) Where a State Party takes measures against a ship in
accordance with this article, it shall:
(i) take due account of the need not to endanger the safety
of life at sea;
(ii) ensure that all persons on board are treated in a manner
which preserves their basic human dignity, and in compliance
with the applicable provisions of international law, including
international human rights law;
(iii) ensure that a boarding and search pursuant to this article
shall be conducted in accordance with applicable international
law;
(iv) take due account of the safety and security of the ship
and its cargo;
(v) take due account of the need not to prejudice the
commercial or legal interests of the ﬂag State;
(vi) ensure, within available means, that any measure taken
with regard to the ship or its cargo is environmentally sound
under the circumstances;
(vii) ensure that persons on board against whom proceedings
may be commenced in connection with any of the offences
set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater are afforded
the protections of paragraph 2 of article 10, regardless of
location;
(viii) ensure that the master of a ship is advised of its intention
to board, and is, or has been, afforded the opportunity to contact
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the ship’s owner and the ﬂag State at the earliest opportunity;
and
(ix) take reasonable efforts to avoid a ship being unduly
detained or delayed.
These provisions reinforce the basic position in respect of the use of force, but also
ﬂesh out detail on how a vessel and its crew must be dealt with. The level of detail
would seem to go well beyond the previously discussed cases.
When ADF and other Australian Government personnel undertake maritime
enforcement operations, including boardings, the above international law establishes
the minimum standard for the use of force. This is both at international and domestic
law, as Australian law adopts the relevant international law to determine the appropriate
minimum standard for the use of force at sea.69
The lack of detail in the relevant international law presents a substantial challenge to
those charged with ensuring the legality of Australian maritime enforcement actions,
and a challenge which they may have to defend not only in Australian courts, but in
international tribunals. The LOSC provides a mechanism for ﬂag States of vessels
that have been subject to arrest and seizure by a coastal State to have their vessel
released through action before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.70 The
Saiga discussed previously is an example of such an action, and it would present an
opportunity for an international tribunal to comment on the legality of the use of force
in boarding operations. Obviously this is an area of international law where further
developments could have a substantial impact upon the manner in which Australia
conducts the enforcement of its laws offshore.
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